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Abstract: Does aggressive use of discretionary fiscal policy induce macroeconomic 
instability in terms of higher output and inflation volatility? Three main conclusions arise 
from our cross-section and panel analysis for a sample of 20 OECD countries: First, 
discretionary fiscal policy has a significant and sizeable effect on volatility of GDP (per 
capita) and all of its components. Second, there is no direct effect on inflation volatility; since 
output volatility is an important determinant of inflation volatility, however, discretionary 
fiscal policy indirectly exacerbates inflation volatility. These results turn out robust with 
respect to alternative fiscal policy measures and endogeneity concerns. Finally, many of the 
fiscal rules introduced since 1990 appear to have reduced the use of discretionary fiscal 
policy. 
 
Keywords: discretionary fiscal policy, output volatility, inflation volatility  
JEL No.: C31, C33, E30, E60
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I. Introduction 
Over the last 15 years many OECD countries introduced fiscal rules. The European Unions 
Maastricht criteria of 1992, which were extended to the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997, 
represent only the most prominent case among numerous changes in the fiscal policy 
framework. This move towards rules rather than discretion reflects a fundamental shift in 
the paradigm of fiscal policy. Not only is it widely accepted now that monetary policy is a 
superior tool for macroeconomic stabilization policy (see Romer and Romer, 1994); it is also 
widely believed today that tying the governments hand by a proper design of fiscal rules can 
help to improve fiscal policy outcomes. Two main arguments are usually put forward to 
support this view: First, to prevent governments from running excessive deficits and from 
conducting unsustainable policies; second, to limit the room for discretionary policy in order 
to improve macroeconomic stability. The latter argument, which is the main subject of this 
study, is based on the assumption that aggressive use of fiscal policy induces instabilities in 
terms of higher output volatility (Fatas and Mihov, 2003a) or higher inflation volatility 
(Rother, 2004). The detrimental effects may go beyond the welfare costs of instability per se 
which are widely viewed to be negligible since Lucas (1987). Fatas and Mihov (2003a) find a 
negative relation between output volatility and long-run growth; and it was already Friedman 
(1977) to argue that inflation volatility is harmful to growth. If discretionary fiscal policy in 
fact lowered output growth by inducing higher volatility the welfare gains from restricting 
fiscal policy discretion could be sizeable (Barlevy, 2004). 
Whether fiscal policy should be left unrestricted or bound by rule, and how such an 
optimal rule would look like, are questions of obvious policy relevance. The widespread 
disagreement in the debate on the reform (abolishment) of the EUs Stability and Growth Pact 
does not only reflect alternative ideological positions but also bears witness that the academic 
debate on a proper framework for fiscal policy is far from settled. Before firm 
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3
recommendations can be derived, however, it is a prerequisite that the effects of discretionary 
fiscal policy have been clarified unambiguously.  
This paper investigates, as carefully and comprehensively as possible, the link between 
discretionary fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability in terms of output and inflation 
volatility. It goes beyond previous studies by investigating the effect on GDP components 
separately, checking the robustness of the results with respect to alternative measures of fiscal 
policy, and by using both a cross-section approach (based on annual data) and a panel 
approach (based on quarterly data). Endogeneity concerns are addressed in two different 
ways: in the cross section estimation, we use (mainly time-invariant) institutional variables 
suggested by Fatas and Mihov (2003a) as instruments; in the panel analysis we use the system 
GMM approach suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). Finally, we also provides a first, 
tentative assessment, whether the fiscal rules introduced by OECD countries over the last 15 
years have indeed led to a significant reduction in the use of discretionary fiscal policy.  
The topic of this paper is related closely to a strand of literature that investigates the 
evolution of output volatility over time and the sources of business cycle volatility. A number 
of studies has noticed that the volatility of the growth rate in real output appears to have fallen 
in OECD countries over the past decade, particularly compared with the 1970s (see Blanchard 
and Simon (2001), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Stock and Watson (2002) for the US, 
Buch, Döpke and Pierdzioch (2004), Fritsche and Kuzin (2005) for Germany, Debs (2001) for 
Canada, Buckle, Haugh and Thomson (2001) for New Zealand and Simon (2001) for 
Australia). Regarding the sources of output volatility, Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause 
(2005) argue that improvements in inventory management, monetary policy, financial 
innovation, international openness and smaller shocks, all played a role in determining a 
widespread fall in output volatility across OECD countries.  This paper adds to this strand of 
literature by investigating the causal link between fiscal policy and output volatility and 
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whether a change in the use of discretionary fiscal policy over time has also contributed to the 
shift in output volatility across countries. 
We find destabilizing effects of discretionary fiscal policy on GDP per capita and its 
components. In contrast, we do not find a direct effect on inflation volatility. Since the 
volatility of output (of the output gap) turns out to be an important determinant of inflation 
volatility, however, discretionary fiscal policy exerts and indirect effect on inflation volatility. 
It is worth emphasizing, how robust the results turn out against alternative measures and 
estimation methods. Finally, most rules introduced by OECD countries over the last 15 years 
appear to have reduced the use of discretionary fiscal policy.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II estimates and compares 
various measures of discretionary fiscal policy. Sections III and IV investigate the effects of 
discretionary fiscal policy on the volatility of GDP (and its components) and the volatility of 
inflation, using both a cross-section and a panel approach. Section V presents some stylized 
facts on the effects of the fiscal rules that have been introduced in several OECD countries in 
the 1990s. The final section VI summarizes the results and concludes. 
 
II. Measuring discretionary fiscal policy 
1. Methodological issues  
There is no consensus in the literature on how to construct a measure of a governments fiscal 
stance. The first question is how broadly fiscal policy should be defined. Fatas and Mihov 
(2003a) consider the expenditure side only, using the narrowest measure (government 
consumption). Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who study the effects of tax and spending shocks 
in a structural VAR approach, include government investment in their expenditure measure. 
Gali and Perotti (2003), in their investigation of the consequences of the Stability and Growth 
Pact for counter-cyclical fiscal policy in EU Member States, focus on the primary budget 
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deficit (They also consider primary spending and revenues separately). A priori, none of these 
measures is superior. One the one hand, expenditures are less responsive to the cycle than 
receipts and hence less vulnerable to endogeneity concerns with respect to GDP than revenues 
or the budget. On the other hand, omitting taxes and other receipts may give an incomplete 
measure of the fiscal stance; this is particularly true if a tax cut is financed by a decrease in 
expenditures, or, mutatis mutandis, in the case of a tax financed expenditure programme. The 
ultimate choice will not only depend much on the question of interest, but will also be dictated 
by the availability of (budget) data. Focussing on OECD countries enables us to pursue a 
comprehensive approach and to check the robustness of the results obtained with alternatively 
defined variables (all of them in real terms): i) government consumption (GC); ii) government 
spending, i.e. consumption and investment (GS); iii) total primary spending, i.e. total 
disbursements excl. interest payments (EXP); iv) total primary receipts, i.e. total receipts excl. 
interest receipts (REC); and v) the primary balance or net lending (NL = REC-EXP).    
Irrespective of which variable is used, it is of crucial importance to distinguish cyclical 
movements (e.g. in the budget deficit) from discretionary changes in fiscal policy. Following 
the notion of Gali and Perotti (2003), the cyclical component may also be termed endogenous 
component of the budget; it is that part of the budget that is driven by forces which are largely 
outside the control of fiscal authorities (at least in the short-run); unemployment benefits are a 
case in point. The structural component, representing discretionary changes by the policy 
makers, may in turn be decomposed into two parts: an endogenous structural component,
which reflects discretionary policy measures taken in response to the state of the economy 
(such as counter-cyclical fiscal policy) and an exogenous structural component, reflecting 
discretionary policy measures unrelated to the state of the economy, i.e. pure fiscal shocks. 
Henceforth, discretionary fiscal policy is always meant to represent this exogenous 
structural component. 
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One approach to decomposing fiscal policy is to partial out business cycle effects in a 
regression of the fiscal policy measure on variables related to the state of the economy; the 
residuals, i.e. that part of the variables unexplained by the state of the economy, may then be 
interpreted as exogenous structural component. This is the approach suggested by Fatas and 
Mihov (2003a). In particular, they use the following regression 
 lnGCi,t = i + ilnGCi,t-1 + ilnYi,t + iWi,t + 
GC
ti , (1) 
where GC is (real) government consumption, Y is real GDP, and W is a matrix of controls 
(inflation, squared inflation, and a time trend). Since Y and GC are likely to be determined 
simultaneously, lnYi,t is instrumented using all other right hand side variables plus two lags 
of output growth (lnYi,t-1, lnYi,t-2), and the natural log of the average crude oil price. This 
regression is run separately for each of the i countries; t denotes the time period which differs 
from country to country due to data availability. Fatas and Mihov (2003a) interpret the error 
term ( GCti , ) as discretionary fiscal shock and view its volatility over a certain time period 
( )( ,
GC
tiVar  )  the typical size of a change in discretionary policy  as indicator of the 
aggressiveness of a governments discretionary fiscal policy. They use a large cross-section of 
countries and consider government consumption (GC) only, but their approach can be easily 
extended to the other fiscal variables mentioned above, i.e. government spending (GS), 
primary spending (EXP) and primary receipts (REC). For the primary deficit (NL), which can 
also take negative values, however, we modify equation (1), taking the absolute difference (in 
per cent of GDP) rather than the log difference as dependent variable. The interpretation of 
the residuals remains the same, now relating to the deficit, however. 
An alternative approach is to start from a cyclically adjusted measure of the fiscal 
variable as calculated by several organizations (OECD, EU Commission, IMF). Together with 
a hypothesis on how policy makers conduct fiscal policy (a fiscal rule) the structural measure 
can be further decomposed into its endogenous and exogenous component. The advantage of 
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this approach is that it yields a complete decomposition of the fiscal measure into all three 
components. There are some drawbacks, however: First it relies on cyclically adjusted 
measures, which requires an estimate of potential GDP. The second is that one has to specify 
a fiscal rule; a governments fiscal behaviour, however, may be hard to summarize with a 
simple equation. Finally, cyclically adjusted measures are unavailable for several countries. 
This approach was suggested by Gali and Perotti (2003), who investigate the consequence of 
the EUs Stability and Growth Pact on fiscal policy, particularly on the room for 
countercyclical fiscal policy. Their empirical model is  
 tiNLA , = i + i 1, tiNLA  + i
e
tiGAP , + iDi,t +
NLA
ti , (2) 
where tiNLA , is the cyclically adjusted, primary deficit (calculated by the OECD), expressed 
in per cent of potential output; a positive value of the parameter in front of the expected 
output gap (GAPe), defined as the deviation of actual from potential output in per cent of 
potential output, is associated with the conduct of counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The debt 
level (D) is included as control variable, reflecting the presumption that a higher level of debt 
leaves less room for manoeuvre. Finally, the lagged dependent variable is included to take up 
the serial correlation in the residuals, which may reflect a partial adjustment process to the 
target level of the adjusted deficit.1 Again the residuals are interpreted as exogenous 
component of the structural deficit; by definition, the predicted values then represent the 
endogenous structural component, which  by least squares properties  have the convenient 
property of being orthogonal to the exogenous component. Apart from the use of a cyclically 
adjusted dependent variable, there are two further differences to aforementioned approach in 
(1): equation (2) is specified in levels rather than in absolute differences of the primary deficit 
 
1 As mentioned by Gali and Perotti, equation (2) can also be interpreted as reduced form of a structural model, 
where governments have a target level of the debt-GDP ratio and there are costs of changing the structural deficit 
over time (see Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2002)).  
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and the dependent variable is expressed in per cent of potential rather than actual output. In 
order to make the estimates for the primary deficit comparable to that obtained using model 
(1) (i.e. the Fatas and Mihov (2003a) approach), we will take first differences of the residuals. 
Rescaling our measure in per cent of actual rather than potential output changes the results 
only trivially, such that we dispense from making this transformation. Finally, to make (2) 
estimable, we follow Gali and Perotti (2002): the expected output gap is replaced by its actual 
value and instrumented using the lagged output gap and the lagged output gap of the USA; for 
the USA the lagged output gap of the EU is used as second instrument.2
2. Estimation  
Previous studies used annual data and focussed on selected measures; often, these restrictions 
were due to the use of large cross section of countries. Our approach is to focus on selected 
OECD countries which allows us i) to give a comprehensive assessment based on various 
measures of fiscal policy using an annual data set, and ii) to extend the previous studies to a 
panel approach using a quarterly data set. Accordingly, we will split the discussion of the 
results into two parts. 
 
2.1 Analysis using annual data 
Depending on the measure used, the number of countries ranges from 18 to 20; the length of 
the time series varies across countries. Table A1 in the appendix gives a detailed overview of 
the samples for the alternative measures. Model (1) was then estimated for each country i,
2 Since (2) is interpreted as fiscal rule, and the first-stage regression as forecast function of the policy maker for 
the output gap, we use the second-stage residuals (rather than the structural residuals) of the IV estimation as 
measure of fiscal shocks. This is also required to obtain orthogonality between the endogenous structural 
component (i.e. the second-stage predicted values from (2)) and the exogenous structural component (i.e. the 
second-stage residuals from (2)). 
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9
using five alternative dependent variables: government consumption (GC), government 
spending (GS), total primary spending (EXP), total primary receipts (REC), all of them in real 
terms3 and log differences, and the primary deficit (NL) in absolute differences expressed in 
per cent of GDP. For each country i, this yields five alternative time series reflecting 
exogenous fiscal shocks: GCtie , ,
GS
tie , ,
EXP
tie , ,
REC
tie , , and 
NL
tie , ; the typical size of these shocks, i.e. 
the measure of the aggressiveness of fiscal policy, is obtained by taking the standard deviation 
of these time series, yielding five variables per country: GCi	 ,
GS
i	 ,
EXP
i	 ,
REC
i	 , and 
NL
i	 .
Model (2) was also estimated for each country i, using the cyclically adjusted primary 
deficit, expressed in per cent of potential output, as dependent variable (NLA). For each 
country i, this yields us an additional time series of fiscal shocks, which was differenced 
( NLAtiv , ) to make it comparable with the measures above; taking the standard deviation again, 
we obtain NLAi	 as sixth alternative measure of the aggressiveness of fiscal policy.  
It is of interest in itself to compare the various measures of discretionary fiscal policy. 
Table 1 shows the correlation between the country-specific standard deviations of the 
exogenous, structural component of the alternative fiscal variables.4
< Table 1 here > 
Considering first the measures constructed with the Fatas and Mihov (2003a) approach (i.e. 
model (1)), we observe that the three expenditure-based measures ( GCi	 ,
GS
i	 ,
EXP
i	 ) are 
highly correlated; thus the size and frequency of changes in government consumption appear 
to reflect a governments behaviour with respect to the overall expenditure side well. 
 
3 For total primary spending (EXP), total primary receipts (REC), and the primary deficit (NL) the GDP deflator 
was used to convert the nominal figures into real terms. 
4 Notice that the time periods from which the country-specific standard deviations are calculated differ somewhat 
across countries as a result of data availability (see Appendix A1). The results are hardly affected, however, if 
overlapping time periods are used.  
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Moreover, the variability of primary spending and revenues are highly correlated as well 
(0.836); thus governments with an active expenditure policy do on average also pursue an 
active tax policy. This is also reflected in the correlation between the variability of spending 
or revenues with the budget (0.712 and 0.624 respectively). Comparing the deficit-based 
measures obtained with the Fatas and Mihov (2003a) and the Gali and Perotti (2003) 
approach, i.e. NLi	 with 
NLA
i	 , the correlations is 0.720. This suggests that the two 
approaches deliver broadly comparable results.  
 
2.1 Analysis using quarterly data 
The use of quarterly data (or higher frequency data) is a natural choice when investigating 
volatility issues. The problem here is that budget data are unavailable at a quarterly level (or 
derived by mechanical interpolations); for several countries, quarterly data on government 
investment is missing as well. Hence, the gain from increasing in observation comes at the 
cost of a reduction in the available measures of fiscal policy. In our quarterly analysis we 
consider only government consumption (GC), which is available for 18 countries. Based on 
the evidence from the annual analysis, however, it is not implausible to assume that our 
measure based on government consumption (GC) can be regarded as representative. Again, 
Table A1 in the Appendix gives a detailed overview of the quarterly sample.  
As before we estimate equation (1) using the log difference of government consumption 
(GC) as dependent variable. In the baseline specification, using just one lag, we find strong 
serial correlation in the residuals. Removing the serial correlation is important for two 
reasons: From an econometric perspective, serial correlation in the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable yields inconsistent estimates. From an economic perspective, the presence 
of serial correlation conflicts with the interpretation of the residuals as exogenous shocks. 
Hence, we extended the lag structure of model (1), adding lags two to four of the dependent 
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variable as explanatory variable; additionally we included one lag of GDP growth (extending 
the instruments up to lag five accordingly). This removes the correlation from all 18 series 
except that of Spain and the United Kingdom ( GC tESPe ,
GS
tGBRe , ). Explicit adjustment for 
autocorrelation using the corresponding AR-terms leads to residual series for these two 
countries, which are highly correlated with the original series, so that  for the sake of 
consistency  we use the same model as for the other countries.  
A further point is worth noting: White tests of the residuals indicate the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in most series (for 12 of the 18 series the White-test is significant and for 3 
further series close to the 10 per cent level). This suggests that it is in fact worthwhile to 
pursue a panel approach to exploit not only the cross-country variation, but also the within-
country variation of the series of fiscal shocks in order to infer something about their effects 
on macroeconomic stability.  
 
III. Fiscal policy and output volatility  
Having obtained several alternative measures of fiscal policy we now go on to provide an 
assessment of the effect of fiscal policy on output volatility. We first consider the cross-
section estimates using annual data; then we turn to the panel estimates using quarterly data.  
To give a first impression of the variation in the data, Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of one of 
our fiscal measures ( GSi	 ) against output volatility. 
 < Figure 1 here > 
 
1. Cross section analysis  
We depart from the baseline model by Fatas and Mihov (2003a); thereby, output volatility, 
defined as standard deviation of the growth rate of output per capita ( yi
ln	 ), is regressed on 
the standard deviation of the fiscal policy measure ( FPi	 ) and several control variables (W):  
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y
i
lnln 	 =  +  FPi	ln + Wi + i (3) 
Three controls are added: government size (GSIZE) to account for the governments 
potentially stabilizing role emphasized by Gali (1994); the log of real GDP per capita (GDP 
p.c.), since poorer countries may more often resort to discretionary policy; finally, trade is 
included as standard control for output volatility as argued by Rodrik (1998).  
Two variables in (3) are likely to be correlated with the error term: the fiscal policy 
measure ( FPi	 ), while constructed in a very careful way, may be still due in part to output 
volatility; moreover, it is likely to be subject to measurement error. Government size (GSIZE)
might be endogenous as well; as argued by Rodrik (1998), more volatile economies may have 
an incentive to set up larger governments. We thus estimate our models using both least 
squares and instruments to ensure that our results are not contaminated by endogeneity of the 
regressors.  
The volatility of fiscal policy ( FPi	 ) is instrumented using the institutional variables 
suggested by Fatas and Mihov (2003a; zero-one dummies for majoritarian (MAJ) and 
presidential (PRES) regimes, a measure of political constraints (PCON), and the number of 
elections (NEL)); as additional instrument, we add the degree of fiscal decentralisation, 
measured in terms of the share of sub-national government expenditures in general 
government expenditures net of intergovernmental transfers (FDEXP).5 The theoretical 
underpinning of these instruments is taken from the growing literature on institutions and 
economic policy (see, for example, Person and Tabellini (2000)) and discussed more in detail 
by Fatas and Mihov (2003a). As far as government size (GSIZE) is concerned, we follow the 
standard approach in the literature and use the dependency ratio (DEP), the urbanization rate 
 
5 For the revenue based measure of fiscal policy, fiscal decentralisation in terms of revenues was used (FDREV); 
for the deficit measures, both FDEXP and FDREV were included as instruments. 
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(URB), and the log of population (POP) as (additional) instruments. A detailed description of 
the variables and the data sources is given in the Appendix.  
Fatas and Mihov (2003a) consider government consumption as measure of fiscal policy 
only. We estimate model (3) using all five measures of fiscal policy derived above in order to 
check the robustness of the results with respect to alternatively defined measures of fiscal 
policy. As a consequence of data availability (particularly budget data and cyclically adjusted 
data) the cross-section dimension i is very low; hence, the panel analysis using quarterly data, 
which is pursued below, is an important complement to the cross-section estimates, which are 
shown in Table 2.  
 < Table 2 >  
Several points are worth emphasizing: First, the coefficient using government consumption 
(GC) as fiscal measure (0.428) is de facto identical to that obtained by Fatas and Mihov 
(2003a) for their subsample of 25 OECD countries (0.490). Second, it is astonishing, how 
robust the findings turn out against the use of alternative measures of fiscal policy. We always 
find a significant impact of fiscal policy on output volatility, whether expenditure-based, tax-
based or budget-based measures are used; it also makes no difference, which of the two 
approaches to estimate the budget-based measure (model (1) or (2)) is pursued. Third, the null 
of valid instruments cannot be rejected by any of the tests of overidentifying restrictions; 
notice that the IV estimates of  are always higher, which points to an attenuation bias of the 
least squares estimates as a result of measurement error.  
The coefficients of the fiscal variables are also economically significant. It is clearly 
unrealistic to assume that the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy could be reduced to zero. 
But it is not implausible to assume that the scope for reducing the volatility of fiscal policy 
( FPi	 ) amounts to one and a half times the standard deviation of 
FP
i	 across countries (on 
average this is less than 40 per cent of the difference between the maximum and minimum 
Page 14 of 42
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
14
value of FPi	 ). According to our estimates this would reduce output volatility by some 27 per 
cent on average; depending on the fiscal measure used the attainable reduction ranges from 22 
to 35 per cent.  
It could be objected that the results in Table 2 (and that of Fatas and Mihov (2003a)) 
have some tautological flavour. Particularly, government consumption (GC) and government 
spending (GS) are part of GDP; hence their volatilities will normally be correlated with that of 
GDP. However, essentially the same results are obtained, if the dependent variable is replaced 
by the volatility of private GDP per capita, i.e. GDP excluding government spending (GS) or
excluding government consumption (GC) when GC is used as fiscal measure. The detailed 
results are given in Table A2 in the Appendix. Here we go one step further and re-estimate 
equation (3), using the volatility of consumption, investment, exports, and imports (all in per 
capita terms) as dependent variable. Table 3 shows the results using the net lending measure 
(
NL
i	 ) as fiscal variable, but as in the previous regressions, the results may be regarded as 
representative for the other fiscal variables as well.   
 < Table 3 > 
We find a significant destabilizing effect of fiscal policy on all GDP components except 
exports. This buttresses the results obtained so far and implies that aggressive use of 
discretionary fiscal policy does not only amplify business cycles by adding noise to the output 
series but that fiscal shocks are propagated through the whole economy and spill over to 
private sector output components as well.6
An important qualification to the results obtained so far is the small number of 
observations. We will thus extend our analysis to a panel approach based on quarterly data in 
the next section. An important message to carry over to the subsequent quarterly analysis, 
which uses only government consumption (GC) as a measure of fiscal policy for reasons of 
 
6 A similar point, though referring to counter-cyclical fiscal policy, was already made by Friedman (1953). 
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data availability, is that the results are extremely robust against using alternative measures of 
fiscal policy. Thus we may reasonably regard the results for GC as representative. 
 
2. Panel analysis  
Using quarterly data has considerable appeal for our question of interest. Using higher 
frequency data is a natural choice, when investigating volatility issues. Moreover, the 
extension to a panel approach not only allows us to increase the degrees of freedom but also 
to control for country- and time-specific effects, which  if correlated with the regressors 
(instruments)  would render our estimates inconsistent. The heteroscedasticity in the series of 
fiscal shocks, i.e. in the residuals of model (1) using GC (see section II), indicates that there is 
significant within-country variation, which is worth being exploited in a panel approach. As a 
compromise to the inherent trade-off between generating a sufficient number of observations 
and choosing sufficiently long subperiods, we split up our sample into non-overlapping 4 year 
intervals. Hence, model (3) becomes 
 yti
ln
,ln
	 = i + 
GC
ti,ln	 + Wi,t + 
t + ti , , (4) 
where i are the country-specific and 
t are the time-specific fixed effects. The cross-section 
dimension i comprises 18 countries; depending on data availability, the country-specific time 
dimension Ti ranges from 4 to 11 (quadrennial) observations, i.e. we have an unbalanced 
panel. As already mentioned above, government consumption is used as only measure of 
fiscal policy in the quarterly analysis for reasons of data availability.  
As in our cross section analysis it is important to check the results from the least squares 
dummy variable estimates (LSDV) with respect to the exogeneity assumption. Moving to a 
panel, however, has important implications for the choice of instruments for the fiscal policy 
variable ( GCti ,	 ): The institutional variables become useless; no variation over time (as in MAJ 
and PRES) or extremely low variation over time (in POLCON, NOELEC, FDEXP, FDEXP)
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make them de facto perfectly collinear with the country-specific fixed effects. Hence, we will 
adopt a less structural approach, exploiting the (testable) assumption that lags of the 
endogenous regressors may be used as instruments. An approach that has gained wide 
acceptance to address endogeneity concerns in a panel framework is the generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimator suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998): Thereby a combined 
system of the equations in levels and in first differences is estimated; in the levels equations 
lags of the first difference of the endogenous variable are used as instruments; in the equations 
in first differences, lagged levels are used as instruments. Validity of the instruments requires 
the absence of second-order serial correlation in the differences specification; overall validity 
of instruments can be tested using a Sargan-type test. The Appendix shows more in detail the 
assumptions underlying the system GMM estimation and its application to model (4).7
As far as GSIZE is concerned, the instruments used in the cross section (DEP, URB,
POP) exhibit enough time variation to be used in our panel; additionally, we use the same lag 
structure as for the fiscal policy variable to improve the informational content of the 
instruments. Table 4 summarizes the results of the least square dummy variable (LSDV) and 
the GMM estimates for alternative GDP components. 
 < Table 4 here > 
Again we find a significant destabilizing effect of fiscal policy on the volatility of GDP and 
all of its components (per capita). Including country- and time-specific effects hardly affects 
the values of the parameter estimates which are very close to the corresponding cross-section 
 
7 Another requirement for the application of the GMM system estimator is that the series are stationary. We 
checked for stochastic trends using panel unit root tests, allowing for individual root processes: the null of a unit 
root is rejected for both output volatility and our fiscal measures. Regarding the presence of deterministic trends, 
it should be borne in mind that all models include time-specific effects; this is equivalent to transforming the 
data into deviations from time means, which implicitly controls for the presence of a common trend.  
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estimates8. As expected, the estimates are more precise, resulting in an improved significance 
level of the coefficients of our fiscal policy variable. As before, the LSDV estimates appear to 
suffer from a downward bias; the GMM estimates are always larger. 
The results cast only little doubt on the validity of the instruments; the tests for serial 
correlation indicate significant (negative) first order serial correlation, but no second order 
serial correlation (as it should be the case if the original residuals in (4) are serially 
uncorrelated, which is required for the instruments to be valid). In two cases the Sargan test 
(based on the one-step residuals) rejects the null of valid instruments; since the test is derived 
under the maintained assumption of homoscedastictiy, this could also be due to 
heteroscedasticity. For two reasons this is likely to be the case here: first, the Sargan tests 
based on the two-step estimates are all insignificant with p-values close to one. Second, it is 
implausible that the instruments are invalid for private GDP, but not for the four GDP 
components, which sum up to private GDP. Together with the cross-section results there 
remains hardly a doubt that aggressive use of discretionary fiscal policy has a pervasively 
destabilizing effect on output. 
 
IV. Fiscal policy and inflation volatility  
The amplification of business cycles is not the only destabilizing effect fiscal policy may 
have; aggressive use of fiscal policy is also argued to increase uncertainty about future 
inflation, for example, via its impact on aggregate demand, expectations about the 
sustainability of fiscal policy, and the effect of taxes on marginal costs and consumption. 
Rother (2004), who also provides a survey of the literature, finds evidence for a positive link 
between discretionary fiscal policy (measured as year-on-year changes in the cyclically 
 
8 See the results for GCi	 in Table 2 and Table A2; this is also true for the effect on the volatility of GDP 
components (not shown in the paper for GCi	 ). 
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adjusted deficit) and inflation volatility, using a sample of 15 OECD countries over the 
periods 1967 to 2001. This issue is of no less importance than the impact of fiscal policy on 
output volatility; it was already Friedman (1977) to argue that it is not inflation per se but 
inflation volatility that is harmful to economic growth. Empirical evidence supporting this 
proposition is provided by Froyen and Waud (1987) and Judson and Orphanides (1999). We 
will take up this issue here and test the impact of fiscal policy on inflation volatility as well.  
In its basic setup, the subsequent analysis corresponds to that of section III. The 
empirical model is similar to (3), now with the standard deviation of inflation (measured as 
the growth rate of the GDP deflator9) as dependent variable and with a slightly different set of 
control variables. Thus, we have  
 	 iln  =  + 
FP
i	ln + Wi + i (5) 
In line with the analysis by Rother (2004), the matrix W includes the following controls: the 
level of inflation (), which is widely recognized as important determinant of inflation 
volatility; GSIZE and TRADE are included for the same reasons as above. Finally the (log of 
the) volatility of the change in the output gap ( GAPi	 ), the volatility of the growth rate of the 
nominal effective exchange rate ( NEERi	 ), and the volatility of adjusted money growth (
GM
i	 )
may affect inflation volatility for obvious reasons and are thus controlled for in the regression. 
A detailed description of the variables and data is given in the Appendix.  
Again we estimate (5) as cross-section using annual data and as panel using quadrennial 
time periods (based on quarterly data), which includes country- and time-specific fixed 
effects. Endogeneity of the fiscal variable and government size may be an issue here for the 
same reasons as above (reverse causality, measurement error); to address these concerns we 
use the same set of instruments as above: in the cross-section estimation of (5), MAJ, PRES,
9 As an alternative measure, we used the CPI deflator, and obtained qualitatively identical results.  
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PCON, and NEL are used as instruments for FPi	ln , and DEP, URB and (the log of) POP as 
instruments for GSIZE; in the panel estimation of (5), a GMM-system approach is employed 
again, with the same lag structure as above (and DEP, URB and (the log of) POP are again 
used as additional instruments for GSIZE). Table 5 summarizes the cross-section and the 
panel estimates of equation (5). 
 < Table 5 here > 
Results are unambiguous, but different from that for output volatility: We find no evidence for 
a direct link between discretionary fiscal policy and inflation volatility, no matter which 
measure is used. It should be noted that the interpretation of the cross-section results is 
severally aggravated due to the small number of degrees of freedom and collinearity 
problems; this may also explain the wrong sign of the output gap variability in some of the 
regressions. Hence, the cross-section results should not be overstressed. 
In the panel estimation the fiscal policy variable turns out insignificant again.10 A 
substantial part of the variation in inflation volatility is explained by the level of inflation, the 
volatility of the output GAP, and the volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate; each of 
these variables is significant and the coefficients show the expected positive sign. An 
important point is that the volatility of the output gap can be replaced by the volatility of GDP 
(or GDP per capita) growth, without altering the basic results (The only difference is that the 
negative coefficient of the volatility of adjusted money growth becomes significant, too.). We 
conclude that fiscal policy has no direct effect on inflation volatility, but it may increase 
inflation volatility indirectly via its effect on output volatility (obtained in section III).11 This 
indirect effect is only of moderate size, however; using the effect of fiscal policy on output 
 
10 This holds true if the volatility of the output gap is omitted. 
11 The similarity of the results when the volatility of the output gap is replaced by that of output growth (per 
capita) is plausible; if the trend growth were constant the two variables should measure exactly the same thing.  
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volatility calculated in section III, the attainable reduction in inflation volatility implied by the 
GMM estimates (using output volatility in (5) rather than the output gap volatility) amounts to 
some 14 per cent on average. 
These results are in strong contrast to that of Rother (2004). This is surprising, since the 
two samples overlap to a considerable extent both with respect to the cross-country and time 
dimension. Since the Rother (2004) study uses only one crude measure of fiscal policy, our 
results, using a variety of measures, cast strong doubt on a direct link between inflation 
volatility and fiscal policy. The insignificant results may also reflect country-specific 
differences; it might be worth to pursue this question further and to investigate country-
specific effects of fiscal policy on inflation volatility in a time series framework.  
V. Fiscal rules and the room for discretionary fiscal policy  
Many OECD countries introduced fiscal rules over the last 15 years; the EUs Maastricht 
criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) are only the most prominent examples. Table 
6 summarizes the fiscal rules introduced in selected OECD countries since 1990. A more 
detailed overview is given by OECD (2002). 
 < Table 6 > 
Two main arguments are usually put forward for the introduction of fiscal rules: to ensure 
sustainability of fiscal policy, and to limit the room for erratic discretionary fiscal policy in 
order to improve macroeconomic stability. It is widely recognized now that the Maastricht 
criteria together with the SGP had a disciplinating effect on fiscal authorities, and that they 
were a driving force of the fiscal consolidations in many EU countries in the 1990s. There is 
less evidence on whether fiscal rules have actually supported macroeconomic stability. The 
results in section II suggest that limiting the use of discretionary fiscal policy is a channel via 
which fiscal rules could potentially reduce output volatility (and indirectly inflation volatility 
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as well). It is unclear, however, whether the fiscal rules introduced have actually achieved a 
reduction in the use of discretionary policy. Fatas and Mihov (2003b), by casual inspection of 
the development of the euro areas (average) fiscal stance (in terms of the year-on-year 
change in the cyclically adjusted budget, and alternatively, using a measure similar to that in 
section II) argue that there is some evidence in favour of this presumption.  
The use of quarterly data allows us to pursue a more formal approach and to explicitly 
test for a break in the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. Table 7 gives an overview of the 
aggressiveness of fiscal policy before and after the introduction of the fiscal rules shown in 
Table 6. To avoid distortions from the rather erratic 1970s our samples start with year 1980. 
 < Table 7 > 
It is remarkable that for all countries except Sweden and Switzerland the volatility of 
discretionary policy has decreased. In judging whether the changes are also statistically 
significant, it has to be borne in mind that our measures of fiscal shocks are residuals from a 
regression model (i.e. we are actually testing for heteroscedasticity in the residuals of model 
(1)). Since the residuals are not independent12, a simple F-test using the ratio of the two 
variances is not applicable. Therefore, we use a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test (see 
Greene, 2003, 223f.). Since the number of observations in our subsamples is fairly low, and 
the test is known to be rather sensitive against the normality assumption we use the robust 
variance estimate suggested by Basset and Koenker (1982). It turns out that of the 16 cases 
considered, 11 changes turn out significant. Nine of the significant changes point to a 
reduction in volatility; six of these nine countries are part of the euro area and underlie the 
rules of the EU Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) including possible sanctions in the case of 
non-compliance (which do not apply to the outs). To reinforce the point, Figure 2 shows a 
 
12 Since e = My = M, where M = I-X(XX)-1X, it follows that Var(e) = Var(M) = 	2MM = 	2M, which is not 
diagonal (even if Var(e) = 	2I) .  
Page 22 of 42
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
22
scatter plot of the change in policy volatility against the change in volatility of output per 
capita.  
< Figure 2 here > 
Some more discussion on the euro area countries seems warranted; we chose 1997 as 
breakpoint, the year when the SGP was passed; basically the same results are obtained if we 
use 1999 (SGP into force) and largely also if we use 1995 as breakpoint. However, if we 
move back to 1992, the year when the Maastricht treaty was agreed upon, the observed 
pattern of changes in Table 7 disappears. A possible interpretation is that fiscal rules take time 
to gain acceptance and that it was the SGP, which ultimately strengthened the credibility and 
commitment envisaged in Maastricht treaty. It is at least difficult to think of any other reason 
that has affected almost all euro area countries alike. Ironically, a few years after the SGP 
started to showed a recognizable effect on fiscal policies (at least according to Table 7), the 
budget problems of several euro area countries (particularly France and Germany) and the 
lack of enforcement of the SGP have lead to a reform proposal by the Commission with 
extended escape clauses, such that the SGP is widely believed to have lost most of its 
credibility and bit. 
But also for five non-euro area countries (Australia, Canada, Norway, Japan, USA) we 
observe a statistically significant reduction in volatility. This is remarkable, given the 
different nature of the rules: in Australia, they imply little more than an obligation to declare 
fiscal goals and to have fiscal policy reviewed by external auditors; in Canadas provinces, 
possible sanctions range from a reduction in salaries up to forced elections.  
Overall, our tentative evidence is suggestive: fiscal rules appear to have indeed 
restricted the room for manoeuvre for discretionary fiscal policy. Our assessment is subject to 
some qualifications: the number of observations is small and the trend may have reversed in 
the late 1990s in some countries. It also provides no answer on why rules, so different in their 
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nature, had similar effects. Detailed case studies of single countries may be an interesting 
extension in order to assess the exact way fiscal rules may have impacted upon fiscal 
behaviour.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper studies extensively the link between fiscal rules, the use of discretionary fiscal 
policy and macroeconomic stability in terms of volatility of GDP per capita (and its 
components) and volatility of inflation, using a sample of 20 OECD countries. We use both a 
cross-section approach based on annual data and a panel approach based on quarterly data. 
Concerns with respect to the proper measurement of discretionary fiscal policy are addressed 
by using alternative variables (ranging from government consumption over the revenues side 
to the governments net primary lending) and two alternative approaches to extract the 
discretionary, i.e. the exogenous structural component of fiscal policy from the data. Concerns 
with respect to (remaining) endogeneity of our fiscal policy variable as a result of possibly 
reverse causality and measurement error are taken up as well: in the cross-section analysis we 
use (mainly time invariant) data on institutions (such as electoral system and political 
constraints) as instrumental variables; in the panel analysis we employ a system GMM 
approach to check the sensitivity of the results with respect to assuming exogeneity of our 
fiscal variable. We then provide some tentative analysis of whether the fiscal rules introduced 
in several OECD countries since the early 1990s have altered the extent to which 
governments use discretionary fiscal policy.  
We identify three empirical regularities: i) There remains little doubt that aggressive use 
of fiscal policy exerts a statistically significant and economically sizeable effect on volatility 
of GDP. Since we find a destabilizing effect on all GDP components, the effect of fiscal 
policy goes beyond amplifying business cycles by just adding noise to the output series: 
Fiscal shocks are propagated through the whole economy and spill over to private GDP 
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components as well. This enforces the results obtained by Fatas and Mihov (2003a) and 
suggests that reduced use of fiscal policy over time is another source of the change in business 
cycle volatility observed in many studies. 
ii) In contrast to a recent study by Rother (2004), we find no evidence that discretionary 
fiscal policy exerts a direct destabilizing effect on inflation. No matter which measure or 
approach is used, the fiscal variable turns out insignificant. Since the volatility of the output 
gap (or equivalently, the volatility of output) is found to be an important determinant of 
inflation volatility, however, fiscal policy exerts an indirect destabilizing effect on inflation.  
iii) Comparing the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy in OECD countries before and 
after the introduction of fiscal rules, we find surprisingly consistent results: In most countries 
the use of discretionary fiscal policy was reduced; in many cases this reduction is statistically 
significant. This is surprising, since the rules considered are rather different in their nature and 
with respect to the possibilities of legal enforcement. In-depth studies of single countries may 
yield interesting answers on the question how fiscal rules have exactly altered the conduct of 
fiscal policy. 
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Appendix  
Data: Definition of variables, sources and samples 
Unless stated otherwise, data were taken from the OECD Economic Outlook Database. Series 
for West Germany as of 1991 were partly chained using data of the reunified Germany. 
Quarterly data for population had to be interpolated. Variables on fiscal decentralization were 
kindly provided by Markus Eller. Cross-country dimension and time dimension: see Table 
A1. 
DEP dependency ratio, i.e. ratio of people younger than 15 and older than 64 to working 
age population (people from 15 to 64) in per cent. Source: World Development 
Indicators. 
EXP real primary expenditures in millions of Euros (base year 1995), general government 
total disbursements exc. gross interest payments, converted into real terms with GDP 
deflator . 
FD
EXP share of sub-national government expenditures in general government expenditures 
net of intergovernmental transfers; Source: World Bank, IMF. 
FD
REV share of sub-national government revenues in general government revenues; Source: 
World Bank, IMF. 
GAP output gap in per cent of potential output, GAP = 100×(GDP-GDP*)/GDP*. 
GC real general government consumption in millions of Euros (base year 1995). 
GDP p.c.real GDP per capita in 1995$ per person (base year 1995, 1995 PPPs of the OECD);  
GDP p.c. = GDP**/POP 
GDP real GDP in millions of Euros (base year 1995). 
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GDP
* real potential output in millions of Euros (base year 1995). 
GDP
** real GDP in millions of 1995$ (base year 1995, 1995 PPPs of the OECD). 
D general government gross financial liabilities in per cent of GDP.  
GM adjusted money growth, defined as money growth (based on M1) minus real GDP 
growth. Source: data on M1 taken from IFS. 
GS real general government spending in millions of Euros (base year 1995); GS = 
CG+IG.
GSIZE government size in per cent of GDP, GSIZE = 100×GS/GDP.
IG real general government fixed capital formation in millions of Euros (base year 
1995). 
MAJ zero-one dummy for electoral system (1 for majoritarian, 0 for proportional). 
Source: Person and Tabellini (2001). 
NEER index of nominal effective exchange rate (1995=100).  
NEL number of elections. Source: Database of Political Institutions. 
NL real primary deficit (net lending) of general government in per cent of GDP;  
NL = (REC-EXP)/GDP.
NLA NL, cyclically adjusted (by OECD) and expressed in per cent of potential output. 
OIL oil price in US-$ per barrel; Source: IFS.  
PCON  index of political constraints, based on Henisz (2000) and taken from the authors 
Webpage. 
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POP population in million persons. 
PRES zero-one dummy for regime (1 for presidential, 0 for parliamentary). Source: Person 
and Tabellini (2001). 
REC real primary receipts (base year 1995), general government total receipts exc. gross 
interest receipts in millions of Euros, converted into real terms with GDP deflator.  
TRADE imports plus exports of goods and services in per cent of GDP.  
URB urbanization rate, i.e. urban population as share of total population in per cent. 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
 rate of inflation, measured as relative change in GDP deflator in per cent. 
 
GMM system estimation of model (4) 
The original specification of equation (4) in levels is given by  
y
ti
ln
,ln
	 = i + 
FP
ti ,ln	 + Wi,t +
t + ti , . (A1) 
Each equation in levels is supplemented by an equation in first differences  
y
ti
ln
,ln
 	 =   FPti ,ln	 + Wi,t +
t +  ti , . (A2) 
The cross-section dimension i runs from 1 to N, the time dimension t from 1 to Ti (unbalanced 
panel). For the sake of brevity, we restrict our attention to the variable FPti ,ln	 here; for GSIZE 
(which is contained in W), exactly the same lag structure is used (and URB, DEP, and POP 
are used as additional instruments).  
In equation (A2) FPti 2,ln 	 and all previous lags are used as instruments for 
FP
ti ,ln	
assuming that E[i,t i,s] = 0 for i=1, . . . ,N and ts  and exploiting the moment conditions that 
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E[ FP sti ,ln	 i,t] = 0 for t = 3,...,1999 and 2s . As a result of differencing and lagging (of the 
instruments), only Ti-2 equations in first differences remain.   
In (A1) lagged first differences ( FPti 1,ln 	 ) are used as instruments
13 for FPti ,ln	 , based 
on the assumption that E[i
FP
i 2,ln	 )] = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N, which (together with the standard 
assumptions for (A2)) yields the additional moment conditions E[i,t
FP
ti 1,ln 	 ] = 0 for 
i = 1,.. . ,N and t = 3,.. . ,Ti, where tiiti ,,  += .
14 Using Monte Carlo studies, Blundell and 
Bond (1998) demonstrate that the finite sample bias of the GMM estimator based on first 
differences only can be reduced substantially with the system GMM estimator. 
 
13 Note that there are no instruments for the first observation FPi 2,ln	 available; as a result of differencing, Ti-1 
equations remain. 
14 This requires the first moment of FPti ,ln	 to be stationary (which is fulfilled here).   
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Table A1.  
Overview of annual and quarterly samples for alternative fiscal variables  
 Annual data  Quarterly data 
GC GS EXP REC NL NLA  GC 
AUS 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1989 
(14) 
 
1961q3  
(166) 
AUT 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1966 
(37) 
1972 
(31) 
1972 
(31) 
1974 
(29) 
 
1961q3  
(166) 
BEL 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1972 
(31) 
1972 
(31) 
1972 
(31) 
1973 
(30) 
 
1981q2  
(87) 
CAN 1964  
(39) 
1964 
(39) 
1983 
(20) 
1983 
(20) 
1983 
(20) 
1982 
(21) 
 
1962q3  
(162) 
CHE 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
- - - - 1961q3  
(166) 
DEU 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1971 
(32) 
 
1961q3  
(166) 
DNK 1963  
(40) 
1973 
(30) 
1973 
(30) 
1973 
(30) 
1973 
(30) 
1981 
(22) 
 -
ESP 1963  
(40) 
- 1966 
(37) 
1966 
(37) 
1966 
(37) 
1981 
(22) 
 
1961q3  
(166) 
FIN 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1978 
(25) 
 
1976q3  
(106) 
FRA 1966  
(37) 
1966 
(37) 
1972 
(31) 
1972 
(31) 
1972 
(31) 
1978 
(25) 
 
1964q3  
(154) 
GBR 1963  
(40) 
1964 
(39) 
1972 
(31) 
1972 
(31) 
1972 
(31) 
1981 
(22) 
 
1961q3  
(166) 
IRE 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1979 
(24) 
1979 
(24) 
1979 
(24) 
1981 
(22) 
 -
ISL 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1972 
(31) 
1972 
(31) 
1972 
(31) 
1981 
(22) 
 -
ITA 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1965 
(38) 
 
1971q2  
(127) 
JPN - - - - - - 1961q3  
(166) 
KOR - - - - - - 1971q3  
(126) 
MEX 1963  
(40) 
1982 
(21) 
- - - - 1961q3  
(166) 
NLD 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1971 
(32) 
1972 
(31) 
1972 
(31) 
1974 
(29) 
 
1978q3  
(98) 
NOR 1963  
(40) 
1964 
(39) 
1964 
(39) 
1977 
(26) 
1977 
(26) 
1979 
(24) 
 
1961q3  
(166) 
NZL 1964  
(39) 
1964 
(39) 
1993 
(10) 
1993 
(10) 
1988 
(15) 
1994  
(9) 
 -
SWE 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1965 
(38) 
1972 
(31) 
1972 
(31) 
1971 
(32) 
 
1961q3  
(166) 
USA 1963  
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1963 
(40) 
1981 
(22) 
 
1961q3  
(166) 
No. 20 19 18 18 18 18  18 
Notes: Starting year of adjusted samples (number of observations); all series go up to 2002 (2002q4).  
In the estimations of the models for inflation volatility, the annual samples are almost the same; only MEX had 
to be excluded due to missing data on the output GAP. In the quarterly samples, BEL, CHE, ESP, MEX, and 
KOR had to be excluded, again due to missing output GAP data. (Overall, the samples also reflect limited data 
availability of other variables used in the estimation such as institutional variables; JPN, for example, could be 
included in the quarterly analysis where no institutional variables are required). 
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Table A2.  
Fiscal policy and volatility of private GDP per capita  Estimation results for model (3) 
 
GC
i	
GS
i	
EXP
i	
OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV 
FP
i	 0.362 0.431  0.368 0.427  0.298 0.310 
(0.060) (0.038)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.004) (0.004) 
GSIZE 0.012 0.019 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.016
(0.373) (0.280)  (0.355) (0.939)  (0.679) (0.417) 
GDP p.c. -0.180 -0.180  -0.357 -0.301  -0.043 -0.045 
 (0.187) (0.171)  (0.014) (0.016)  (0.788) (0.807) 
TRADE -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.824) (0.650)  (0.662) (0.803)  (0.995) (0.887) 
Adjusted R2 0.279   0.528   0.238  
OID (p-val.)  (0.369)   (0.147)   (0.577) 
observations 20 20  19 19  18 18 
 
REC
i	
NL
i	
NLA
i	
OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
FP
i	 0.392 0.413  0.637 0.824  0.314 0.309 
(0.001) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.014)  (0.032) (0.061) 
GSIZE -0.014 -0.015  -0.023 -0.006  -0.017 -0.014 
 (0.349) (0.457)  (0.128) (0.785)  (0.436) (0.501) 
GDP p.c. 0.114 0.135 -0.129 -0.133  0.163 0.165 
 (0.476) (0.475)  (0.467) (0.543)  (0.489) (0.464) 
TRADE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.243) (0.236)  (0.680) (0.964)  (0.937) (0.959) 
Adjusted R2 0.391   0.282   0.109  
OID (p-val.)  (0.213)   (0.420)   (0.171) 
observations 18 18  18 18  18 18 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln *ln yi
	 , where y* is GDP excluding government spending (GS) per capita 
(excluding government consumption (GC) for the model using GCi	 ). See also Table 3. 
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Table 1.  
Correlations between the country-specific standard deviations of structural, exogenous 
component of alternative measures of fiscal policy 
 
GC
i	
GS
i	
EXP
i	
REC
i	
NL
i	
NLA
i	
GC
i	 1 0.837 0.700 0.379 0.362 0.298 
GS
i	 0.837 1 0.628 0.427 0.626 0.414 
EXP
i	 0.700 0.628 1 0.836 0.712 0.579 
REC
i	 0.379 0.427 0.836 1 0.624 0.561 
NL
i	 0.362 0.626 0.712 0.624 1 0.720 
NLA
i	 0.298 0.414 0.579 0.561 0.720 1 
Notes: Pairwise correlations, using the maximum number of (overlapping) observations available (see Table A1). 
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Table 2.  
Fiscal policy and volatility of GDP per capita  Estimation results for model (3) using 
alternative measures of fiscal policy 
 
GC
i	
GS
i	
EXP
i	
OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV 
FP
i	 0.376 0.428  0.362 0.444  0.343 0.379 
(0.056) (0.041)  (0.007) (0.010)  (0.003) (0.001) 
GSIZE -0.003 0.000  -0.011 -0.017  -0.011 0.002 
 (0.819) (0.995)  (0.054) (0.097)  (0.406) (0.923) 
GDP p.c. -0.186 -0.179  -0.365 -0.298  -0.100 -0.086 
 (0.164) (0.161)  (0.014) (0.021)  (0.530) (0.645) 
TRADE 0.000 -0.001  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.875) (0.765)  (0.879) (0.828)  (0.926) (0.890) 
Adjusted R2 0.389   0.580   0.371  
OID (p-val.)  (0.252)   (0.126)   (0.402) 
observations 20 20  19 19  18 18 
 
REC
i	
NL
i	
NLA
i	
OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
FP
i	 0.438 0.466  0.646 0.860  0.332 0.350 
(0.000) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.025) (0.044) (0.078) 
GSIZE -0.036 -0.033  -0.048 -0.026  -0.041 -0.033 
 (0.027) (0.130)  (0.015) (0.358) (0.072) (0.150) 
GDP p.c. 0.081 0.104 -0.164 -0.174  0.100 0.132 
 (0.602) (0.593)  (0.375) (0.449) (0.668) (0.579) 
TRADE 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.146) (0.175)  (0.522) (0.950) (0.891) (0.996) 
Adjusted R2 0.485   0.348   0.123  
OID (p-val.)  (0.113)   (0.342)  (0.168) 
observations 18 18  18 18  18 18 
Notes: Dependent variable is (the natural log) of the standard deviation of GDP per capita growth ( yi
ln	 ). All 
regressions contain a constant. FPi	 is the standard deviation of the respective measure of fiscal shocks. The p-
values in parentheses are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. OID reports the p-value of the 
heteroscedasticity-robust test of overidentifying restrictions in the instrumental variable regression (see 
Wooldridge, 1998). 
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Table 3.  
Fiscal policy (measured as
NL
i	 ) and volatility of GDP components (per capita)  
 consumption   investment  exports  imports 
OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV 
NL
i	 0.911 2.022  0.687 1.344  0.312 0.433  0.396 0.853 
(0.016) (0.036) (0.050) (0.066) (0.149) (0.222) (0.082) (0.050)
GSIZE -0.032 0.009  -0.027 0.002  -0.021 -0.017  -0.039 -0.032 
 (0.244) (0.879) (0.333) (0.959) (0.209) (0.424) (0.026) (0.217)
GDP p.c. -0.384 -0.308  -0.079 -0.044  -0.425 -0.417  -0.377 -0.328 
 (0.157) (0.542) (0.698) (0.902) (0.073) (0.093) (0.002) (0.037)
TRADE 0.003 -0.001  0.002 0.000  0.000 -0.001  -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.294) (0.829) (0.197) (0.973) (0.887) (0.718) (0.599) (0.243)
Adjusted R2 0.326   0.092   0.185   0.471  
OID (p-val.) (0.852) (0.419) (0.172) (0.444)
observations 18 18  18 18  18 18  18 18 
Notes: Dependent variables are the (natural logs) of the growth rate of consumption (investment, exports, 
imports) per capita. See also Table 2. 
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Table 4.  
Fiscal policy (measured as GCi	 ) and volatility of GDP and its components  Panel estimates 
for model (4) 
 GDP  private GDP  Consumption 
LSDV GMM  LSDV GMM  LSDV GMM 
0.263 0.412  0.272 0.435  0.156 0.327 GC
i	
(0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.234) (0.010) 
GSIZE 0.024 0.010 0.031 0.026 0.034 0.028
(0.295) (0.446)  (0.153) (0.074)  (0.134) (0.271) 
GDP p.c. 0.269 0.069 0.234 0.067 0.341 0.069
(0.000) (0.136)  (0.000) (0.142)  (0.000) (0.354) 
TRADE -0.003 0.002  -0.002 0.002  -0.002 0.001 
 (0.599) (0.242)  (0.677) (0.071)  (0.708) (0.746) 
Adjusted R2 0.535   0.547   0.466  
m1 (p-val.)  (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.003) 
m2 (p-val.)  (0.841)   (0.705)   (0.257) 
Sargan (p-val.)  0.005   0.005    0.135 
Observations 149 320  149 320  148 318 
 
investment  exports  imports 
 LSDV GMM  LSDV GMM  LSDV GMM 
0.182 0.451  0.155 0.235  0.035 0.303 GC
i	
(0.124) (0.003)  (0.098) (0.008) (0.626) (0.000) 
GSIZE 0.019 0.053 0.064 0.022 0.038 -0.000 
 (0.122) (0.082)  (0.000) (0.203) (0.000) (0.987) 
GDP p.c. 0.003 -0. 052  0.001 -0.020  0.550 -0.032 
 (0.956) (0.068)  (0.970) (0.692) (0.021) (0.539) 
TRADE -0.004 0.006  0.004 -0.003  0.004 -0.001 
 (0.445) (0.049)  (0.309) (0. 450) (0.313) (0.665) 
Adjusted R2 0.687   0.558   0.602  
m1 (p-val.)  (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.003) 
m2 (p-val.)  (0.453)   (0.938)   (0.848) 
Sargan (p-val.)  0.148   0.522   0.558 
observations 142 298  148 318  148 318 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis are bases on robust standard errors. Cross-sections dimension i = 18 countries; 
time dimension Ti is country-specific, ranging from 4 to 11 ( depending on data availability). All models include 
individual- and time-specific fixed effects. GMM  one step GMM-system estimates (Blundell and Bond, 
1998) using robust standard errors. m1 (m2) are the p-values of first (second) order serial correlation test. Sargan 
test (which assumes homoscedasticity) is the one-step version (p-values of Sargan test based on two-step 
residuals are close to one). To ensure comparability both LSDV and GMM estimates cover the same time period. 
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Table 5.
Fiscal policy and inflation volatility  Cross section and panel estimates of model (5) 
 
GC
i	
GS
i	
EXP
i	
REC
i	
OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV 
1.140 1.246  1.499 1.343  0.564 0.371  0.503 0.435 FP
i	
(0.247) (0.225) (0.190) (0.211) (0.014) (0.155) (0.118) (0.277)
PID 0.319 0.324 0.324 0.322 0.094 0.103 0.085 0.091
(0.058) (0.051) (0.048) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.017)
GSIZE 0.146 0.182 -0.021 -0.021  0.034 0.010  0.008 -0.018 
 (0.163) (0.131) (0.201) (0.192) (0.037) (0.739) (0.556) (0.487)
TRADE -0.020 -0.022  0.179 0.193  -0.002 0.000  0.001 0.002 
 (0.244) (0.217) (0.135) (0.141) (0.371) (0.848) (0.604) (0.390)
0.644 0.553  -1.872 -1.804  -1.222 -1.031  -0.668 -0.653 GAP
i	
(0.612) (0.666) (0.271) (0.269) (0.018) (0.028) (0.184) (0.177)
-1.724 -1.704  -0.638 -0.585  0.034 -0.001  0.016 -0.044 NEER
i	
(0.250) (0.241) (0.329) (0.360) (0.896) (0.997) (0.962) (0.903)
-0.234 -0.227  1.010 1.124  0.307 0.290  0.189 0.189 GM
i	
(0.612) (0.626) (0.549) (0.505) (0.020) (0.012) (0.119) (0.175)
Adjusted R2 0.464   0.514   0.874   0.810  
OID (p-val.) (0.654) (0.401) (0.212) (0.267)
observations 19 19  18 18  18 18  18 18 
 
NL
i	
NLA
i	
GC
i	 , panel estimates 
OLS IV  OLS IV   LSDV GMM 
0.307 0.894  0.011 0.036   -0.165 0.090 FP
i	
(0.617) (0.293) (0.953) (0.846) (0.105) (0.359) 
PID 0.248 0.236 0.245 0.247 0.253 0.402
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GSIZE 0.014 0.005 0.026 0.012 0.019 0.018
(0.729) (0.908) (0.293) (0.735) (0.324) (0.579) 
TRADE 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.022) (0.098) (0.013) (0.033) (0.887) (0.780) 
-1.017 -1.133  -0.913 -0.983   0.401 0. 157 GAP
i	
(0.062) (0.039) (0.192) (0.146) (0.018) (0.008) 
-0.031 -0.146  0.047 0.049   0.122 0.186 NEER
i	
(0.905) (0.579) (0.791) (0.788) (0.274) (0.084) 
0.205 0.189  0.206 0.209   -0.110 -0.026 GM
i	
(0.123) (0.114) (0.243) (0.222) (0.568) (0.774) 
Adjusted R2 0.856   0.853    0.856  
OID (p-val.) (0.567) (0.605) 0.026 1) 
observations 18 18  18 18  96 179
Notes: Cross-section estimates: see also Table 2. Panel estimates: Cross-section dimension i = 13 countries; time 
dimension Ti is country-specific, ranging from 4 to 11. 
1) is value of the one-step variant of Sargan test (again, 
The p-value of the two-step variant is close to one); p-values of tests for first order and second order serial 
correlation tests are 0.009 and 0.365, respectively.  
Page 40 of 42
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
40
Table 6.  
Fiscal rules introduced in OECD countries since 1990 
Australia: Charter for Budget Honesty, 1998 
Rules: No legislated numerical rules; government is required to specify targets (no constraints on their nature). 
Enforcement: Annual fiscal strategy statement; assessment by external auditors. No sanctions. 
Austria: Domestic Stability Pact, 2000 
Rule: Negotiated floors on budget balance for each government level; floors apply on average, over several years. 
Enforcement: Possible fines (up to a ceiling), subject to unanimous decision from all interested parties. 
Belgium: Intergovernmental treaties, 1996 to 2002 
Rule: permissible deficits for federal government, Social Security, regions and local governments. 
Enforcement: Permissible deficits based on recommendations of the High Council of Finance (a wise men 
committee), which are published in annual reports.  
Canada: Federal Spending Control Act, 1991-1996 
Rules: Limits on programme spending (except self-financing programmes); overspending in one year permitted 
if offset in following two years. 
Enforcement: No explicit sanctions; assessment of compliance with the Act by Auditor General. 
Debt Repayment Plan 1998 
Rules/Enforcement: Federal government: no legislated rules, but balanced budget or better policy; provinces: 
balanced budget legislation (with sanctions including salary cuts for cabinet members or forced elections.) 
Euro area/EU countries: Maastricht Treaty, 1992; Stability and Growth Pact, 1997 
Rules: 3 per cent of GDP ceiling on general government net borrowing; 60 per cent of gross government debt-to-
GDP ratio norm; Close to balance or surplus target. 
Enforcement: Annual stability (euro area ins) or convergence (outs) programme, which is subject to an 
opinion from the Council. Excessive deficit procedure; from peer pressures, based on policy recommendations 
based on the Commissions assessment to non-r munerated deposits. 
Japan: Fiscal Structural Reform Act, 1997/1998 
Rules: Reduction of fiscal deficits to 3 per cent of GDP by 2003; termination of issuance of special deficit-
financing bonds by 2003; numerical reduction targets for major expenditure areas over next three years. 
Enforcement: No explicit sanctions. 
Norway: Fiscal Stability Guidelines, 2001 
Rules: Structural non-oil central-government budget deficit should equal 4 per cent of the Government 
Petroleum Fund over the cycle; discretionary easing or tightening during the cycle is allowed. 
Enforcement: Reports of the structural fiscal balances including and excluding oil revenues, complemented with 
annual update of long-term projections; no sanctions. 
Sweden: Fiscal budget Act, 1996 
Rules: Nominal expenditure limits for subsequent three years on 27 expenditure areas (including social security); 
maintain a general government surplus of 2 per cent of GDP on average over the business cycle. 
Enforcement: No explicit sanctions. 
Switzerland: Budget Objective 2001, 1998 
Rule: federal deficit capped at 2 per cent of revenues or 0.25 per cent of GDP by 2001; Debt Containment Rule 
Enforcement: Expenditure excess to be financed by tax increase. 
UK: Code for Fiscal Stability, 1997 
Rules: Golden rule (over the cycle the government will borrow only to invest); sustainable investment rule (net 
debt as a proportion of GDP must be held stable over the cycle at a prudent level; defined as 40 per cent). 
Enforcement: Annual reporting cycle (Pre-Budget Report, Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report, Debt 
Management Report); no explicit sanctions.  
USA: Budget Enforcement Act, 1990 to 2002 
Rules: Medium-term nominal caps for discretionary spending; legislated changes to revenues or mandatory 
spending programmes should be budget neutral over a five-year horizon. 
Enforcement: Sequestration procedures (cuts across-the-board). 
Source: OECD (2002).  
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Table 7.  
Fiscal rules and discretionary fiscal policy: evidence from selected OECD countries  
 AUS AUT BEL CAN CHE DEU ESP FIN 
break T 1998 1997 1997 1996 1998 1997 1997 1997 
GC
i	 , t < T 1.542 0.613 0.838 1.021 0.685 1.440 0.863 0.836 
GC
i	 , t  T 1.137 0.511 0.514 0.746 0.901 0.863 0.266 0.802 

GC
i	 in % -26.2 -16.6 -38.7 -26.9 31.4 -40.0 -69.1 -4.2 
LM (p-val.)1) (0.004) (0.181) (0.163) (0.000) (0.106) (0.012) (0.001) (0.520) 
FRA GBR ITA JPN NLD NOR SWE USA 
break T 1997 1997 1997 1998 1997 2001 1997 1990 
GC
i	 , t < T 0.432 1.185 0.961 0.697 0.725 1.805 1.203 0.825 
GC
i	 , t  T 0.376 1.112 0.666 0.619 0.595 1.618 1.817 0.753 

GC
i	 in % -12.9 -6.1 -30.6 -11.3 -18.0 -10.4 51.1 -8.7 
LM (p-val.) (0.006) (0.042) (0.006) (0.014) (0.319) (0.015) (0.002) (0.005) 
Notes: The sample periods range from 1980q1 to the last quarter of the year before T, and from Tq1 to 2002q4.  
1) p-value of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for heteroscedasticity (level shift as of T), using the robust 
variance estimator suggested by Koenker and Basset (1982) (see also Greene, 2003, p. 224.) 
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Figure 1.  
Fiscal policy and output volatility (1960  2000) 
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Figure 2.  
Fiscal policy and output volatility before and after introduction of fiscal rules 
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